



**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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§
§

VS.

CASE NO. 1:09-CR-109(17)

GUADALUPE HUERTA DIAZ

§

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON GUILTY PLEA
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

By order of the District Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for administration of a guilty plea and allocution under Rules 11 and 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Magistrate judges have the statutory authority to conduct a felony guilty plea proceeding as an “additional duty” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). *United States v. Bolivar-Munoz*, 313 F.3d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 123 S. Ct. 1642 (2003).

On December 21, 2009, this cause came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for entry of a guilty plea by the defendant, on **Count I** of the charging **Information** filed in this cause. Count I of the Information charges that from on or about 2002, the exact date being unknown, to on or about March 28, 2007, in the Southern District of Texas, the defendant,

Guadalupe Huerta Diaz, did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully conspire, combine, confederate and agree with others known and unknown to the United States Attorney, to commit offenses against the United States, that is to conduct and attempt to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate and foreign commerce, which involved the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, to wit: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one thousand kilograms or more of a Schedule I controlled substance, namely, marijuana, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846, knowing that the property involved represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, with the intent to conceal and disguise the nature, source, or ownership of such proceeds, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), said financial transactions being the receiving of or attempting to receive and the delivery or attempted delivery of a bulk money shipment of United States currency in the amount of seventy-nine-thousand-dollars (\$79,000.00) received at the direction of Joe Emmanuel Sanchez, on March 23, 2007, for the purpose of delivery to Miguel Angel Acevedo via Roberto Noriega on March 28, 2007, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h). *See Information.*¹

Defendant, Guadalupe Huerta Diaz, entered a plea of guilty to Count I of the Information into the record at the hearing.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 the Court finds:

¹ The Court admonished the Defendant about proceeding by Information and the Defendant agreed to waive his right to indictment on the record at the guilty plea hearing.

a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the guilty plea in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Texas subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.

b. That Defendant and the Government have entered into a plea agreement which was disclosed and addressed in open court, entered into the record, and placed under seal.

c. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, and that the plea of guilty is a knowing, voluntary and freely made plea. Upon addressing the Defendant personally in open court, the Court determines that Defendant's plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats or promises. *See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).*

d. That Defendant's knowing, voluntary and freely made plea is supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offense and Defendant realizes that his conduct falls within the definition of the crimes charged under 18 U.S.C. § 641.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

As factual support for Defendant's guilty plea, the government presented evidence with the plea agreement. *See Factual Basis, Included in Plea Agreement.* In support, the Government would prove that Defendant, Guadalupe Huerta Diaz, is one and the same person charged in the Information and that the events described in the Information occurred in the Southern District of Texas. The Government would also have proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every

essential element of the offense alleged in the Information through the testimony of witnesses, including expert witnesses, and admissible exhibits. In support of the Defendant's plea, the Court incorporates the proffer of evidence described in detail in the factual basis portion of the plea agreement.

Defendant, Guadalupe Huerta Diaz, agreed with the evidence included in the plea agreement. Counsel for Defendant and the Government attested to Defendant's competency and capability to enter an informed plea of guilty. The Defendant agreed with the evidence presented by the Government and personally testified that he was entering his guilty plea knowingly, freely and voluntarily.

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

IT IS THEREFORE the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the Guilty Plea of Defendant which the undersigned determines to be supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offense charged in **Count I** of the charging **Information** on file in this criminal

proceeding. The Court also recommends that the District Court accept the plea agreement.² Accordingly, it is further recommended that, Defendant, Guadalupe Huerta Diaz, be finally adjudged as guilty of the charged offense under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h).

Defendant is ordered to report to the United States Probation Department for the preparation of a presentence report. At the plea hearing, the Court admonished the Defendant that the District Court may reject his plea. The District Court may defer its decision to accept or reject the plea agreement until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3).

OBJECTIONS

Within ten (10) days after receipt of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations contained within this report within ten (10) days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from *de novo* review by the District Judge of the proposed findings,

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“(3) Judicial Consideration of a Plea Agreement.

(A) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.

(B) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request.

(4) Accepting a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement, it must inform the defendant that to the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the agreed disposition will be included in the judgment.

(5) Rejecting a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects a plea agreement containing provisions of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court must do the following on the record and in open court (or, for good cause, *in camera*):

(A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;

(B) advise the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea; and

(C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated.” FED. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)-(5).

conclusions and recommendations, and from appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court except on grounds of plain error. *Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (*en banc*); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

SIGNED this the 21st day of December, 2009.



KEITH F. GIBLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE